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The generalization of the problem of adaptive competition, known as the minority game, to
the case of K possible choices for each player is addressed, and applied to a system of interacting
perceptrons with input and output units of the type of K-states Potts-spins. An optimal solution
of this minority game as well as the dynamic evolution of the adaptive strategies of the players are
solved analytically for a general K and compared with numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Considerable progress in the theoretical understanding
of market phenomena has been achieved by the study of
the minority game. This prototypical model describes
a system of agents interacting through a market mech-
anism [1–6]. The game is based on the idea that the
behavior of the agents is determined by the economic
rule of supply and demand. According to this rule, given
the available options (such as buy/sell), an agent wins
if he chooses the minority action. The research of this
game has been focused on cases in which each agent can
choose between two options using its most efficient strat-
egy, where the strategies remain unchanged throughout
the game [1–6]. However, in the real world, many situa-
tions of interest involve more than two decision options
as well as agents with dynamic strategies. Making deci-
sions like where to spend the summer vacation or which
server to choose while surfing the web (or more generally,
how to distribute data traffic in computer networks [7])
are only two among many common problems with more
than two options. Therefore, it is tempting to investi-
gate cases with more than two possible choices provided
to agents with dynamic strategies. In a recent study of
an extension in which each agent is equipped with a neu-
ral network for making his decision [8] it was shown that
a certain updating rule of the strategies of the agents im-
proves the efficiency of the market, which is measured by
the global profit of the agents. In this paper we gener-
alize the aforementioned work to a multi-choice minority
game, namely a game with general K decision states.
The multi-choice minority game consists of N players
(agents) and K possible decisions. In each step, each
one of the players chooses one of the K states, aiming to
choose the state with the smallest number of agents. For
example, a situation may arise, in which there are several
possible roads which lead from place A to place B, and
each driver who wants to get from A to B chooses one of
the available roads. Because drivers want to avoid traffic
jams, they try to choose the least traveled roads, assum-
ing that all the roads are of the same length. Similarly,
one usually prefers to go to the bar with the smallest
number of people in it. Occurring over and over again,
the minority decisions in these and other similar situa-
tions generate time series whose term at time t, xt, has
an integer value between 1 and K according to the mi-
nority decision. In the original game, the information
provided to each player is the history vector of size M ,
whose components are the last M minority states.
The paper is organized as follows: In section II a multi-
layer neural network and the dynamic evolution of its
weights are introduced. For the clarity of the rest of the
paper which is somewhat technical we briefly discuss the
main findings and results. In section III the reference
case of players with random strategies is solved analyt-
ically. In section IV the global profit of the players for
the network with optimal strategies (weights) is solved
analytically in the thermodynamic limit, and shown to
be superior to a random decision. The analytical results
are compared with simulations on finite systems. In sec-
tion V, the suggested updating rules for the weights are
examined analytically and are found to saturate asymp-
totically the optimal global profit. Finally, section VI is
devoted to a short summary and an outlook.
II. THE MODEL
While many strategies for the multi-choices minor-
ity game are conceivable, we study the following model
which uses neural networks: each one of the N players
is represented by a perceptron of a size M . The weights
belonging to the ith player are {wij} where j = 1, ...,M .
All N perceptrons have a common input which consists
ofM components x1, ..., xM , where each one of the com-
ponents can take one of the K integers, 1, 2, ..., K, with
equal probability.
The dynamics are defined by the following steps. In the
first step, each one of the perceptrons calculates the K
induced local fields. For instance, the field him induced
by the mth state on player i is defined as the summation
over all weights belonging to the ith perceptron with in-
put equal to m:
him =
M∑
j=1
wijδxj,m. (1)
1
In the second step, each player chooses its state, {σi},
following the maximal induced field:
σi = {k1 | max
m=1,..,K
him = hik1}. (2)
where σi is the output (chosen state) of ith perceptron.
In the third step, the occupancy of each state is calcu-
lated:
Nρ =
N∑
j=1
δσj ,ρ, (3)
where it is clear that
∑
ρNρ = N . The output min of
the network is the minority decision
min = {ρ | min
m=1,..,K
Nm = Nρ}, (4)
The game can also be represented by a feedforward
network M : N : 1 (M input units, N hidden units and
1 output). All units (input, hidden, output) are rep-
resented by K-states Potts-spins. The weights {wij} are
from the input units to the hidden units, and the weights
from the hidden units to the output are all equal to −1.
The dynamics of hidden and output units are similar to
zero temperature dynamics of Potts-spin systems [9,10],
following the maximal induced field. The free parameters
in our game are the MN weights, {wij}, from the input
to the hidden units. Their values will be determined by
the strategy adopted by each one of the players. Our lo-
cal dynamic rules are based on the generalization of the
on-line Hebbian learning rule for K = 2 [8] to general
K-states Potts model with the following updating rule;
w+ij = wij +
η
M
(Kδxj,min − 1) (5)
where η is the learning rate and the sign + indicates the
next time step. Note that all agents use the same rule
for updating their strategy.
The score of the game is determined similarly to the
Ising case. Players belonging to the minority (Nmin play-
ers) gain Q+, while the other N−Nmin players gain Q−,
where Q+ > Q−. Note that in most previous works Q+
was chosen to be 1 and Q− was chosen to be either 0 or
−1. The global profit in such cases is
U = Q−N + (Q+ −Q−)Nmin. (6)
It is clear that the maximization of the global profit
U is equivalent to the maximization of Nmin, which is
bounded from above by N/K. Note that in the Ising
case each player belongs either to the minority or to the
majority, where in the Potts case the situation is more
complex. The score may depend on the exact values of
{Ni} (the score decreases with Nρ), hence the total profit
U = U({Ni}). In such a case the maximization of the
total profit may differ from the maximization of Nmin,
and will be discussed briefly in the end of this paper.
Before we turn to discuss the guideline of the derivation
of the results, which are more involved than for the Ising
case, let us present the main results: (a) The score and
the dynamics are formulated analytically for general K,
the number of possible decisions. Exact results are ob-
tained forK ≤ 6 and asymptotically forK →∞. Results
for intermediate values of K are obtained from simula-
tions. (b) A relaxation to the optimal score is achieved
for small learning rates. (c) Regarding the optimal case,
the deviation of minority group size from N/K is found
to be non-monotonic with K. (d) The total score is in-
dependent of the size of the history (M , the size of the
input) available for the agents. (e) All agents are using
the same type of dynamic strategy and gain on average
(over time) the same profit. Our system does not un-
dergo a phase transition to a state where the symmetry
among the agents is broken into losers and winners [4,5].
Throughout the investigation of the game we assume that
the memory size M is larger than the number of players
N (otherwise the completely symmetric Potts configura-
tion is geometrically impossible). Albeit, simulations of
the same dynamic for systems with M < N show even
better results for the global profit.
III. THE RANDOM CASE
In case where the maximization of the global profit U
is identical to the maximization of Nmin, the quantity of
interest is
< ǫmin
2 >=
1
N
< (Nmin −N/K)2 >, (7)
where the symbol < > indicates an average over in-
put patterns, and N/K is the average number of players
in each state. Note that in our calculations the input
vector presented to the players at each step of the game
consists of random components [4,8], instead of the true
history. Nevertheless, simulations indicate that the sys-
tem behavior is only slightly affected by the randomness
of the inputs and the game properties remain similar.
For random players, each weight (among the MN
weights {wij}) is chosen from a given unbiased distribu-
tion and a variance 1/M . Hence, the distribution of the
overlap R between weights belonging to any two players
ρ and φ
Rρφ =
M∑
j=1
wρjwφj (8)
is a Gaussian with zero mean and variance 1/M . In the
thermodynamic limit and forM > N , one can show that
in the leading order the overlap between each pair is an
independent random variable. For random players and
K = 2 one finds < ǫ2 >=<
∑
ρ(Nρ −N/K)2/(NK) >=
1/4; however, for general K even the derivation of a sim-
ilar quantity is non-trivial. The two cornerstones of the
calculations below are the probability of a microscopic
2
configuration P ({σi}), and the degeneracy D({Nρ}) of
a macroscopic configuration {Nρ}, which is given by the
multinomial coefficient:
D({Nρ}) = N !∏
ρNρ!
. (9)
In the large N limit, the typical deviation of the size
of each group from N/K is expected to scale with
√
N .
Hence we define:
Nρ = N/K + ǫρ
√
N (10)
where it is clear that
∑
ρ ǫρ = 0 and without the loss of
generality we assume Nmin = N1 ≤ Nρ ∀ρ > 1. Ap-
plying the Stirling approximation to Eq. (9) yields the
degeneracy as a function of {ǫρ}:
DK({ǫρ}) ∼ KN exp(−K
2
K∑
ρ=1
ǫ2ρ)δ(
K∑
ρ=1
ǫρ). (11)
If the average over Rρφ, which we denote by R, is 0, the
agents make their choice independently and randomly,
so each microscopic configuration has the same probabil-
ity PK = (1/K)
N . Now the average over ǫ2min can be
evaluated:
< ǫ2min >R=
∫ 0
−∞ ǫ1
2dǫ1Πρ>1
∫∞
ǫ1
dǫρDK({ǫρ})PK({ǫρ})∫ 0
−∞ dǫ1Πρ>1
∫∞
ǫ1
dǫρDK({ǫρ})PK({ǫρ})
.
(12)
The quantity < ǫmin
2 >R=0 was calculated numeri-
cally for K = 3, 4, 5, 6 and found to be equal to
∼ 0.313, 0.322, 0.320, 0.309, respectively (see Fig. 1).
Results obtained from simulations with N = 5000 and
K ≤ 6 are in an excellent agreement with Eq. (12). For
K > 6 the reported results in Fig. 1 were derived only
from simulations and are in an excellent agreement with
the asymptotic behavior of Eq. (12), < ǫ2min >R=0∼
2 log(K)/K. Another quantity of interest is the average
deviation of the average number of players in each state
from N/K, < ǫ2 >=< 1K
∑
ρ ǫ
2
ρ >. Similarly to Eq. (12),
this quantity can be derived analytically and gives
< ǫ2 >R=0=
K − 1
K2
. (13)
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FIG. 1. Simulations for < ǫmin
2 > as a function of
K for both the optimal case R = − 1
N−1
(solid curve) and
the random case R = 0 (long dashed curve). Analyti-
cal results up to K = 6 agree with simulations for both
R = − 1
N−1
(filled circles) and R = 0 (triangles). Inset:
ΓK =< ǫmin
2 >R=0 / < ǫmin
2 >
R=−
1
N−1
as a function of
K.
IV. THE OPTIMAL CASE
So far we have compared < ǫmin
2 > and < ǫ2 >
for random players, where the average overlap is zero.
Without breaking the symmetry among the players, the
weights can be represented by N weight vectors which
are symmetrically spread around their center of mass.
More precisely, we denote the weight vector of the ith
perceptron as wi, and assume that it can be expressed
as
wi = C+ gi, (14)
where the center of mass C ≡ 1N
∑
iwi, and {gi} are N
unit vectors of rank M obeying the symmetry
gi · gj = (1 + 1
N − 1)δij +
1
N − 1 . (15)
Hence, the total profit andNmin are functions of only one
parameter, C. It is clear that the maximization of the
total profit or Nmin (as for the case K = 2) is obtained
when C = 0, which is the maximal achievable homoge-
neous repulsion among N vectors of rank M > N . The
repulsion is the natural tendency of each player in the mi-
nority game, since the goal is to act differently than other
players. Without a cooperation which breaks the players
into sub-groups, the maximal homogeneous repulsion is
R = −1/(N − 1).
The two questions of interest are the following: (a)
What is < ǫ2 > and < ǫmin
2 > as a function of K for
the optimal solution, C = 0 and R = −1/(N − 1)? (b)
Is the optimal solution achievable by local dynamic rules
for each one of the players? We first examine the for-
mer question regarding the optimal solution, and then
we turn to study the dynamic behavior of the players.
The average deviation of the number of players in each
state from N/K at C = 0 and for R = O(1/N) can
be calculated analytically. The main idea is that this
quantity can be calculated similarly to Eq. (12), or via
< ǫ2 >= 1/(NK) < (
∑K
ρ=1
∑N
i=1 δσi,ρ −N/K)2 >. The
simplification of the later expression is such that an aver-
age over only a pair of players has to be done. The result
as a function of K gives
< ǫ2 >R=
K − 1
K2
+R(N − 1)(K − 1)Kµ, (16)
where µ = [
∫∞
−∞
e−h
2
2π (1−H(h))K−2dh]2 and H(x) =
0.5 erfc( x√
2
).
Regarding the optimal score, the quantity of a partic-
ular interest is < ǫ2min >R= −1
N−1
. This quantity has to be
compared with < ǫ2min >R=0 in order to estimate the im-
provement in the average global gain relative to the ran-
dom case. Note that the calculation of Eq. (12) for R 6= 0
is nontrivial since PK({ǫρ}) is no longer independent of
the configuration {ǫρ}. However, we can overcome this
difficulty in the following way. For R = O(1/N) one can
show that in the leading order PK({ǫρ}) has the same
form as DK({ǫρ}):
PK({ǫρ}) ∼ (1/K)N exp(−A(R)
K∑
ρ=1
ǫ2ρ)δ(
K∑
ρ=1
ǫρ), (17)
where the exact value of A(R) is unknown. The obser-
vation that both PK({ǫρ}) and DK({ǫρ}) have the same
dependence on {ǫρ} (Eqs. (11) and (17)) indicates that
the ratio < ǫ2min > / < ǫ
2 > is independent of R if
R = O(1/N), and in particular:
< ǫ2 >R=0
< ǫmin2 >R=0
=
< ǫ2 >R=− 1
N−1
< ǫmin2 >R=− 1
N−1
= βK . (18)
This property can be easily derived by rescaling ǫρ →√
A(R)ǫρ in the integral representation (Eq. (12)) of
each one of the four terms in Eq. (18). The same prefac-
tor appears both in the denominator and in the numera-
tor, and the dependence of βK on R via A(R) is cancelled
out. Using Eq. (18), < ǫmin
2 >R=− 1
N−1
can be obtained
indirectly from the knowledge of the other three terms,
which are given by Eqs. (12), (13), and (16). Results for
< ǫmin
2 >R=− 1
N−1
are presented in Fig. 1. In order to
confirm our analytical results we performed simulations
for the optimal case, Eqs. (16) and (18), with C = 0. The
simulations were done in two stages. In the first stage,
N normalized vectors of rankM , obeying the constraints
that the overlap among each pair is equal to −1/(N−1),
are generated using a recursive process. The details of
the algorithm will be given elsewhere [11]. In the second
stage, < ǫmin
2 > and < ǫ2 > were averaged over about
105 randomly chosen inputs for a system with N = 400
and M = 5000. An excellent agreement between simu-
lations and analytical results was obtained (see Fig. 1).
The improvement in the global gain can be measured by
the ratio ΓK =< ǫmin
2 >R=0 / < ǫmin
2 >R= −1
N−1
. This
ratio decreases monotonically with K such that its max-
imal value Γ2 = 2.7548 and for K → ∞ ΓK → 1 (inset
of Fig. 1).
V. THE DYNAMICS WHICH LEAD TO THE
OPTIMAL SOLUTION
So far we derived the properties of the optimal solution
for different values of K. Now we are turning to the sec-
ond question: is the optimal solution achievable by local
dynamic rules (Eq. (5))? After averaging Eq. (5) over
j and in the limit where the number of examples, αM ,
scales with the number of input units M , one can find
the following equation of motion for the center of mass
dC2
dα
= 2ηK <
∑
j
Cjδxj,min > +η
2(K − 1), (19)
where < > denotes an average over the random ex-
amples. For large M , in the leading order each input
vector divides each weight vector into K equal groups of
size M/K. The minority state is the one whose group
of weights gives the minimal sum. Using Eq. (19) and
M,N → ∞, < ∑j Cjδxj ,min > is the average mini-
mal sum of a set of M/K center of mass components,
{Cj}. These M/K quantities are random variables with
zero mean and variance C2/M ( <
∑M/K
j=1 Cj >= 0
and < (
∑M/K
j=1 Cj)
2 >= C2/K). One can find that
<
∑
j Cjδxj ,min > is equal to
C
2
(K − 1)
√
K
π
∫ ∞
−∞
e−y
2/2
√
2π
[H(
y√
2
)]K−2dy. (20)
Hence, for a given K, Eqs. (19) and (20) indicate a lin-
ear relation between the fixed point value of C and the
learning rate η with corrections of O(1/
√
N). As η → 0,
C → 0 and the system approaches the optimal configu-
ration. The interplay between C and η was confirmed by
simulations, where finite size effects decay as the size of
the system becomes larger. This effect is depicted in Fig.
2 for K = 3. The explicit dependence of < ǫmin
2/N >R
on C can be found for R ∼ O(1/N) via the relation
R =
C2 − 1N−1
C2 + 1
. (21)
Results of simulations for < ǫmin
2 >R as a function of C
for N = 103 and M = 200 are presented in the inset of
Fig. 2. An excellent agreement between the analytical
prediction and simulations was obtained in the regime of
C ∼ O(1/√N) (corresponding to R ∼ O(1/N)).
4
0.00 0.25 0.50
η
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
C
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
C
0
1
2
3
<Gmin
2
>
FIG. 2. C as a function of η for K = 3. Analytical
results (solid line) and simulations for N = 103, M = 200
(long-dashed), and for N = 400, M = 403 (dashed-line). In-
set: < ǫmin
2 > as a function of C for K = 3. Analytical
results (solid line) and simulations for N = 103, M = 200
(filled circles).
Note that although the global gain U which corre-
sponds to the Boolean case is monotonic withK, the non-
monotonic behavior of ǫmin implies that for non-Boolean
cases non-monotonic behavior of U may be obtained.
VI. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In this paper we introduced a generalization of the mi-
nority game to the case of multi-choice. The problem was
applied to a multilayer network with updating rules for
the weights (strategies). Static and dynamic properties
of the strategies were solved analytically for various K’s
and were found to be in a good agreement with simula-
tions on finite systems. This modification of the minor-
ity game to the case of multi-choice open a manifold of
new questions, which certainly deserve future research.
We have chosen two of those questions to briefly discuss
here.
Firstly, as we have pointed out before, the function ac-
cording to which the profit is awarded is not necessarily
Boolean as in Eq. (6). In fact, the model is more realis-
tic when the profit of a player is related to the size of his
group, as well as to the size of the other groups [12]. Our
analysis can be applied to these cases if the maximiza-
tion of the global gain is equivalent to the maximization
of the minority group. However, other scores may not
fulfill this required condition. In these cases, it has to be
determined whether the optimal symmetric configuration
remains the maximal repulsion.
Secondly, the other strategies for the minority game
that have been studied can be generalized to multi-choice
situations in a straightforward manner: in the original
game [1,2,5,6] where each player has several decision ta-
bles, each table entry is now a value between 1 and K.
In Johnson’s stochastic strategy [13,14], each player has
a probability of choosing the outcome that was success-
ful the last time, or to pick one of the others with equal
probability. In the strategy of Reents [15], players who
were not in the minority could switch to some other ac-
tion with a small probability in the next time step. Sim-
ilarly, other conceivable strategies can also be general-
ized. Preliminary checks imply that all these modified
strategies show similar behavior compared to that of the
binary-choice game, even though their theoretical treat-
ment probably becomes more involved. While outcomes
of these games certainly have to be measured against the
reference values given in Eqs. (12) and (13), it is not
clear under what circumstances relations like Eq. (18)
hold for other strategies.
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